Ball possessed a keen insight into the Vietnam conflict in
some of its earliest stages. Ball argued some fundamental principles. The first is
probably the most important in understanding his position. Ball believed that the South
Vietnamese were losing in their attempts against the Viet Cong and were losing badly.
Ball believed that the United States could not merely "support" or "advise" and expect
success because the loss margin was so large. At the same time, Ball believed that US
involvement to a degree of full commitment could not guarantee success. Ball made a
keen distinction in using the term "white" in his memo to the President, arguing that
there was some challenges in a foreign American battalion moving into foreign
territory:
No one has demonstrated that a white
ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war--which is at the same time a civil
war between Asians--in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses
cooperation to the white forces (and the South Vietnamese) and thus provides a great
intelligence advantage to the other side. . .
Ball's argument
that this is a war outside of the scope of US expertise is not only demonstrated through
the syntax of "White" to highlight the difference, but also in the invocation of a
guerilla style war. Ball understood that the Viet Cong would not accomodate Americans'
wishes and fight a war in the traditional sense, but rather use guerilla tactics,
terror, and a sense of the surprise including keen intelligence of the surroundings in
order to achieve maximum impact. Finally, Ball believed that the Civil War aspect
between North and South Vietnam ends up disappearing once the Americans become involved,
a move that would also trigger the Chinese and Russian Governments, both feeling
compelled to support their North Vietcong ally. While this might not have fleshed out
exactly as Ball envisioned, he was accurate in that the Civil War aspect disappeared
once America involved itself in the conflict.
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